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Francis Bloch† Axel Gautier‡
May 12, 2006
Abstract
Postal markets are open to competitor for a long time. But, with a
few exceptions, the competitors of the incumbent postal operator are
currently active on the upstream segments of the market -preparation,
collection, outward sorting and transport of mail products. With the
further steps planed in the liberalization process, there are new op-
portunities to extend competition to the downstream segments of the
market -the delivery of mails. In the future, two business model will
be possible for the new postal operators: (1) access: where the firm
perform the upstream operations and uses the incumbent’s delivery
network and (2) bypass where the competing firm controls the entire
supply chain and delivers mails with its own delivery network. These
two options have a different impact on both the welfare and the profit
of the historical operator. In particular, bypass raises severe concerns
for the financing of the universal service obligations.
The choice between access and bypass depends on the entrant’s
delivery cost relative to the cost of buying access to the incumbent
operator (the access price). In this paper, we derive optimal -welfare
maximizing- stamp and access prices for the incumbent operator when
these prices have an impact on the delivery method chosen by the
entrant. We show how prices should be re-balanced when the entry
method is considered as endogenous i.e. affected by the incumbent’s
prices.
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